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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
normally operative rule leaves the drawer without remedy in this one in-
stance. By the shifting of liability, this amendment serves as a conduit
through which the commercial world has forced the drawer to rely upon
insurance. Relegated to this position, the drawer then seeks to protect
himself from commercial loss and is not concerned with the labels placed by
the criminal law upon the acts causing his loss. Under these circumstances,
a court cannot fairly conclude that the insured intended to be subjected to
the modern counterparts of common law anomalies such as the larceny-
false pretenses distinction. Based also upon considerations of fairness,
Article 2 of the UCC provides that risk of loss falls upon a breaching party
only to the extent to which it exceeds the other party's insurance. 28 Thus,
insurance coverage is now an item to be pleaded at the trial of a contract
action and ambiguous policy terms should be construed in accordance with
business usage.
The law regarding fictitious payees is not relevant to the definition of
forgery as used in the bond. Plaintiff's claim in the principal case could
have been sustained without the agency holding. Given the proper agency
relationship, and assuming for a moment that the standards of the local
criminal law must be met, defendant's contention still lacks merit. Sec-
tion 9(3) of the NIL relieves the bank from liability for cashing the forged
check for purposes of commercial loss placement. In doing so, it does not
state that the indorsement is not forged nor that it in any way purports to
change the criminal law. The indorsements are still essential as a practical
matter, since the instruments are not known as bearer paper until the fraud
is discovered. But compliance with criminal law standards should not be
necessary. The burden of placing a definition more narrow in scope within
the four corners of the policy rests with the drafting party. In the absence
of such stipulation, the intent of the parties must be sought. Principles of
fairness are contravened when a construction contrary to that of common
business usage is adopted as having been intended by a party who relies
upon insurance out of commercial necessity. This is especially true when
such construction favors the party who has received consideration for as-
suming the risk of loss.
MICHAEL J. DORNEY
Public Utility Company—Rates—Judicial Review.—Pacific Tel. El Tel.
Co. v. Hill. 1 —In May, 1958, the plaintiff, the Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co., filed new tariffs with the Public Utilities Commission in
order that its rate of return on investment, plant materials and supplies
would be raised from 5.42 per cent to 7.04 per cent on the basis that the
present 5.42 per cent return was confiscatory. The commissioner held a hear-
ing at which it was determined that the 5.42 per cent rate was confiscatory
UCC § 2-510.
1 365 P.2d 1021 (Ore. 1961).
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and that a fair return would be 6.35 per cent. An order to that effect was
issued. The controversy centered around the allocation of the company's
property between inter and intrastate use to establish the state rate base.
The order employed $126,794,131 (average investment for test period)
tentatively as the rate base, but reduced this amount to $120,600,017. The
reduction of $6,194,114 was arrived at partly by the use of an expert's
formula which tripled the actual use and a new application of the standard
M-M-M formula. 2 Thus property worth $6,194,114 was treated as non-
intrastate. The company appealed 3 to the circuit court, Marion County,
which sustained its objections whereupon the commissioner appealed to the
supreme court. HELD: The commissioner's findings as to interstate and intra-
state allocation of the company's property were insufficient for judicial review.
The court found that there was no evidential basis for determining (1) that
the value of an interstate call was three times the value of an intrastate call
and (2) that the M-M-M formula used by the commissioner, as applied to a
plant serving both intra and interstate use, was not based on a finding that
the property thus reduced from the intrastate rate base was not used in
intrastate operation.
The central focus of the case results from the dissenting opinion of
Justice O'Connell with Justice Sloan concurring, in which he sharply criticizes
the majority for exercising its independent judgment and subjecting the
commission's findings to a de novo review "under the so-called authority
of the Ten Avon' doctrine."4 The Ben Avon doctrine is best stated in the
words of the court that conceived it: 6
In all such cases if the owner claims a confiscation of his property,
will result, the State must provide a fair opportunity for submitting
that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own
independent judgment as to both law and facts otherwise the order
is void because in conflict with the due process clause, Fourteenth
Amendment.
It is surprising that the dissent should be so vigorous in the denunciation of
de novo review in as much as the same court has previously specifically ad-
mitted the necessity of de novo review after a charge of confiscation.°
2 Id. at 1033, "The Manual explains the formula of M-M-M in these words: The
term 'conversation' (message-minute-miles) is the product of (a) the number of mes-
sages, (b) the mileage haul and (c) minutes of conversation per message. The purpose
of course is to secure the dimensions of the average call."
3 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 756.580.
4 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
5 Id. at 289.
6 Valley & Siletz R.R. v. Flagg, 195 Or. 683, 714, 247 P.2d 639, 654 (1952): "The
fact that in cases which are based on averments of confiscation the courts try the issues
de novo. . . ." Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wallace, 158 Or. 210, 75 P.2d 942 (1938).
But see Butcher v. Flagg, 185 Or. 471, 203 P.2d 651 (1949): "In our opinion the
plaintiffs have failed to 'show by clear and satisfactory evidence' that the order of
the Commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence, or that such is unlawful, or
that the Commissioner erred in the application of the rule of law to the matter under
consideration."
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The doctrine should not be simply referred to as the Ben Avon doc-
trine—for, if it exists at all, it no longer exists in its original form. Ben Avon
was modified or clarified in the St. Joseph case where the Court said:
"Judicial judgment may be nonetheless appropriately independent because
informed and aided by the sifting procedure of an expert legislative agency." 7
To be sure neither the Ben Avon doctrine nor the modified Ben Avon
doctrine has been followed in the Supreme Courts and at least in the federal
courts it has been mitigated by the acceptance of the substantial evidence
rule,° and again further when the Supreme Court held:
. . . [that] it is the result reached [and] not the method employed
which is controlling . . . it is not [the] theory but the impact of
the rate order that counts . if the total effect of the rate order
cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry .. .
is at an end.'°
The present status of the doctrine is at best in doubt and the subject
of some speculation." To be sure many states do not allow for the in-
dependent judgment of a de novo review but apply the substantial evidence
rulela or variations thereof short of complete independent review. Of these
some jurisdictions have specifically stated that they do not exercise in-
dependent judgment. 13 Ben Avon is accepted and still has vitality in a few
jurisdictions."
7 St. Joseph Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
8 Supra note 1, at 1037 (dissent) ; see also 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§ 29:09, at 167 (1958).
FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942) ; see also Mr. Justice
Brandeis dissent, Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, supra note 4, at 292,
18
 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
11
 Miller and Joslin, Public Utility Rate Regulation: A Re-examination, 43 Va. L.
Rev. 1027, 1044 (1957):
But, on policy grounds as well as it being the teaching of many cases in the
state courts, it is evident that Ben Avon is followed and should be followed. .
It can be stated without equivocation that Ben Avon, Professor Davis to the
contrary notwithstanding, has not died. As modified by the St. Joseph Stock
Yard and the Hope decisions, the Ben Avon doctrine allows for an independent
review of rate-making but attaches a presumption validity to the administrative
findings.
Jaffee, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 953, 982
(1957), "But even assuming that Ben Avon is still law, its operational impact has been
enormously mitigated." 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29:09, at 167 (1958).
The author feels that the Ben Avon doctrine has gradually died.
12 Forkosch, Administrative Law 246 (1956): "In other words the judiciary treats
the agency as it would a jury asking only whether the jury had sufficient evidence before
it upon which it could proceed." Stason, Substantial Evidence in Administrative Law,
89 U. Pa. L. Rev, 1026, 1036 (1941): [Substantial evidence] • . "may be related to
the term arbitrary and capricious action in such a manner as to prevent setting aside
decisions only if found to be arbitrary. Indeed the view seems to be rather frequently
adopted by the courts."
13 4 Davis, op. cit. supra note 8 § 29:09, at 176-78, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island.
14 Valley & Siletz R.R. v. Flagg, 194 Or. 683, 247 P.2d 639 (1952) ; Southern Con-
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However the majority of jurisdictions limit judicial review of administra-
tive rate orders to the lawfulness and reasonableness of the order and
to whether the order is supported by substantial evidence. That is, in looking
at the whole record, the court must answer the simple question whether the
evidence supports the finding."
It is submitted that there is no nice, tight definition into which this
substantial evidence test can be fitted. It is a flexible test which varies from
what appears to be a minimal, superficial and approving glance at the record
usually with the bland statement that the commissioner's findings carry with
them the presumption of validity, to a thorough and complete review which
looks into every corner, with the equally all-encompassing statement that
the plaintiff carries the burden of proof. The latter, although without say-
ing so, many times approaches de novo review."
It does not seem that the smoke screen of the supposed evils of the
Ben Avon doctrine raised by the dissent was proper. The company's appeal
from the order was handled in the best tradition of the substantial evidence
rule, flexible as it may be. The plaintiff was not challenging the 6.35 per cent
rate of return but the allocation of its property.
The majority correctly determined that if the disputed property was
devoted to intrastate use the plaintiff company would be denied any return
on that property and thus its actual rate of return would be 5.71 per cent
which is less than the commissioner had established as a fair return. The
majority also pointed out that shoiild this property be shifted to interstate, a
10.15 per cent increase in its interstate rate would be necessary. The under-
lying reasoning of the majority was the hardly arguable rule that intrastate
property should not be shifted to interstate for rate making purposes to
lighten the intrastate burden. Regardless of value or formula, a proper
allocation between interstate and intrastate property should be made. 17
tinental Tel. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'r, 199 Tenn. 122, 285 S.W.2d 115 (1955) ;
Railroad Cornm'r v. Houston Nat. Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 289 S.W.2d 559 (1956) ; Iowa
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Ft. Dodge, 248 Iowa 1201, 85 N.W.2d 28 (1957) ; Application of
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 69 S.D. 36, 6 N.W.2d 165 (1942) ; Staten Island Edison
Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947) ; Opinion of the Justices, 328
Mass. 679, 106 N.E.2d 259 (1952) ; Central Maine Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'r,
156 Me. 295, 163 A.2d 762 (1960).
15 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Bodies § 211 (1942):
In the absence of statutory directions to the contrary, and of any vital defect such
as one with respect to jurisdiction or procedure, and except as there may be
an exception for findings of fact bearing upon constitutional or jurisdictional
issues, it is the general rule that administrative findings of fact are conclusive
upon a reviewing court, and not within the scope of its reviewing powers, at
least if supported by evidence, or substantial evidence, or competent evidence, or
based upon conflicting evidence.
15 4 Davis, op. cit. supra note 8, § 29:11, at 186, see also § 29:08, at 152: "The scope
of review in state courts varies not only from state to state but often from agency to
agency within the same state." See also Notes, 15 Wyo. L.J. 6 (1960), 6 Utah L. Rev.
406 (1959).
17 Wheat, Interstate Telephone Rates, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 846; Smith v. Bell Tel.
Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930) ; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1912).
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Here, although this court has reviewed rate determinations de novo
when the charge of confiscation is made,'s it does not appear that the court
did in fact in this instance review de novo. It must be admitted that it was
perhaps close to de novo review," ) for the plaintiffs had the burden of
proof.2° But even by a rigid substantial evidence test the allocation could
not stand. Because the commissioner's duties were outined,21 the court found
it easy to say: "we have mentioned that there is no finding that the rate
base . . . which the commissioner's order shifts from intrastate to interstate
. . . are not employed and incurred in the operation of the intrastate plant."22
De novo review is not to be condemned merely because the Supreme Court
now provides for Iess review, for although perhaps not constitutionally
necessary, there is nothing to restrict a state from providing de novo review
or substituting its independent judgment.23
JOSEPH L. COTTER
Sales—Transfer of Title—Federal Retailers' Excise Tax.—Around The
World Shoppers Club v. United States.' —Around The World Shoppers
Club (Club) was an enterprise to which persons subscribed to receive
"gifts" which were shipped directly to them from a different foreign country
for each month of their subscription. To join, the persons submitted to the
Club an application for membership and payment in advance for the "gifts."
Upon acceptance of the application, the Club sent a label bearing the mem-
ber's name and address to foreign suppliers which had agreed with the Club
to ship "gifts" to its members. The Club handled all communications both
with its members and with the foreign suppliers. The suppliers were re-
sponsible only to the Club for adjustment of any claims against them and
received payment for the "gifts" from the Club. The Club brought suit to
recover a part payment made under a Federal Retailers' Excise Tax2 assess-
ment on the value of the "gifts" which had been sent to its members. The
U.S. District Court, in granting a government counterclaim for the unpaid
18 Supra note 6.
19 Supra note 1, at 1032, "So that we will not be misunderstood we add that the
evidence affords no basis for determining the value of a call or of saying that an inter-
state call has any greater value than an intrastate call."
29 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 757.585 (1959). But see supra note 1, at 1025, "The company's
witness established at least primit facie that the part of the plant represented by the sum
of $6,194,114 was devoted to intrastate service . ." (emphasis added).
21 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 757.055 (1959), "The Commissioner shall value all the property
of every public utility used or useful for the convenience of the public ... ," Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 756.550(3) (1959), "After the completion of the taking of evidence and within a
reasonable time the commissioner shall prepare and enter findings of fact and conclusions
of Iaw upon all the evidence received in the matter and shall make and enter his order
thereon. . . ."
22 Supra note 1, at 1036.
23 See Opinion of the Justices, supra note 15.
1 198 F. Supp. 773 (D.N.J. 1961).
2 68A Stat. 473 (1954), 26 U.S.C. §§ 4001-057 (1958).
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